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Impact of the Financial Crisis on
Derivative Valuation
Sam Berklacich

INTRO
The financial crisis of 2007 highlighted some tremendous flaws within the
financial industry. In a little over a year, close to $8 trillion was wiped out from the
U.S. economy with significant ripples sent through out the global economy. The
world’s largest economy had fallen victim to one of the most exotic and complex of
financial instruments in the global economy: derivatives. With a present day market
valued over 5x the domestic GDP, financial derivatives still play a major role within
the industry. Furthermore, a very significant portion of the derivatives market is
traded “over-the-counter” with much less regulation. The derivatives market is still
a significant player on the balance sheets of large financial institutions. As evident
from the crisis, these institutions are pivotal factors to the health and vitality of our
economy. Therefore, due to the immense size of the derivatives market and the vast
influence of such instruments on our economy, serious reform, regulation, and risk
evaluation was required to reign in the rampant market.
For this paper, I will be analyzing the impact of the liquidity/credit crisis on
derivative valuation. At the beginning of the 21st century, derivatives were a
relatively new financial asset with little regulation and oversight. A derivative, in
essence, “derives” its value from some underlying asset. Derivatives can be
structured on assets such as equities, equity indices, foreign exchange rates, as well
as interest rates. The market for derivatives expanded drastically in the years
preceding the financial crisis, with all major banks holding stake in the market.
Derivatives can also be customized to the needs for specific deals. This unique

nature, coupled with minimal oversight, made derivatives a very appealing asset to
financial institutions. The lack of regulation, however, created an immense amount
of confusion surrounding the market for derivatives.
In addition to the lack of regulation, financial institutions were creating a
variety of instruments that were connected to derivatives. Out of the asset-backed
securities, banks created Collateralized Debt Obligations. Additionally, banks would
sell insurance on their liabilities in the form of Credit Default Swaps, an instrument
used to protect institutions from loan defaults. Liabilities were being packaged and
dispersed through out the market, but the risk was never minimized. Banks became
highly leveraged and dependent on the web of liabilities, with no one analyzing the
effects of default or risk. Therefore, when the payments for asset-backed securities
dried up, institutions found themselves with minimal capital to fulfill short-term
obligations. The banks had repackaged and sold a majority of their assets, leaving
their balance sheets occupied with toxic assets. When the fear of default became a
reality, many financial institutions became wary of the credit quality of their
counterparts. This created a hoarding mentality as institutions doubted the
credibility of counterparties and the demand for liquidity spiked. LIBOR, the
determinant rate for borrowing in the short-term market, is also used to discount
future cash flow payments, ultimately calculating a present value in all derivatives
positions. When banks began hoarding, rates at which they lent rose significantly
and drastically affecting derivative valuations. For years, collateralized derivatives
were discounted at the LIBOR rate when it was believed to be “risk-free.” Now,
financial institutions see the flaw in this rate and are transitioning to a multi-curve

discount approach involving the Overnight-Indexed-Swap rates. Thus, I will be
examining the impact of transitioning to OIS discounting on derivative valuation and
the foreseeable effects on financial institutions.
Derivatives and the Financial Crisis
The years leading up to the financial crisis were highlighted by the rise in
asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and various other forms of
exotic derivatives. The market for these financial instruments skyrocketed and
quickly caught the attention of financial institutions. The largest player, mortgagebacked securities, is considered the most instrumental component in the financial
crisis. In essence, banks began pooling loans of mortgages from all across the
country and slicing them in to tranches to then be sold to investors. These assets
were attractive due to high rate of return offered on the payment of mortgages and
the seemingly endless supply of mortgages loans. At this point, the real estate
market in the United States was posting gains year after year, fueled by Fed
sponsored low-interest rates that spanned every corner of the domestic market. In
this credit expansion, capital flowed to those in need and created an influx of
mortgages as people sought to capitalize on the gains in the real estate market. A
vicious cycle was created, littered with textbook definitions of agency problems as
financial institutions, loan originators, and ratings agents all acted on personal
interest. Additionally, banks began highly-leveraging their financial statements by
creating collateralized debt obligations from the original mortgage-backed
securities. Instead of mitigating risk, this financial asset increased risk exponentially
as more and more tranches of mortgages were split-up, repackaged, and sold into

the marketplace. Banks became very leveraged with out anyone ever noticing the
environment that had been created. No one ever stopped to analyze the effects of
risk of default from the mortgage payments and how ensuing impact. Furthermore,
a majority of these trades were funded through various forms of collateral and no
one stopped to analyze the effect of a shortage of collateral to margin-funded
transactions. According to Markus Brunnermeier, due to highly leveraged
transaction and reliance on short-term capital, “any reduction in lending would
cause significant stress on the system” (Brunnermeier). Unbeknown to the U.S.
economy, a reduction in lending was imminent and would send the market in to a
downward spiral.
During August 2007, liquidity in the mortgage market was drying up rapidly
with companies like Countrywide facing severe pressure to roll over commercial
paper. In fact, Countrywide issued a write-down of almost $11.5 billion due to the
lack of funding. Analysts began reversing position on the stock, labeling the
company with negative outlook. At the end of the week, shares of Countrywide had
declined close to 15%, a 50% decline on the year. The shortage of liquidity in the
market had made it near impossible to determine the fair value of mortgage-backed
assets. In a recent study, the U.S. Government Pricing Agency estimated that up to
95% of all lower-rated tranches were impaired due to the sub-prime mortgages.
Add such market uncertainty to spiking interest rates and determining fair value for
asset-backed securities became near impossible. During the same time period, BNP
Paribas suspended three investment funds with over $2.2 billion assets between
them – with “over 30% of all assets rated AA or higher” (GPO). The bank issued a

statement saying “the complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments
has made it impossible to value certain assets,” regardless of their quality of credit
rating (GPO). The liquidity evaporated because banks became wary of the credit
standing of other institutions. In this time, many institutions had balance sheets
comprised of subpar assets. With default becoming a very possible scenario, banks
tightened lending standards to preserve capital. Between the months of May and
August, the market for asset-backed commercial paper shrank from $35 billion to $4
billion. Furthermore, the average maturity of short-term loans declined over 25% as
institutions assessed the credit-worthiness of counter parties in shorter intervals.
Uncertainty among financial institutions increased from2007 to 2008, sending
interest rates to record levels, and further complicating the valuation for derivative
transactions.
LIBOR/TED
Until this point, the prices for all derivatives were discounted using LIBOR as
the risk-free rate. LIBOR is an acronym that stands for London Interbank Offered
Rate. It is the “average interest rate estimated by leading banks in London that they
would be charged if borrowing from other banks” (Risk.net). Comprised of 16
leading banks, the group determines the LIBOR rate by providing bids for the
interest rates they would offer to other prominent banks. Although it was first used
in 1984, LIBOR has become the prominent rate for determining borrowing rates
among financial institutions, In today’s market, the 16 banks that determine LIBOR
“have placed rates on a staggering $360 trillion financial instruments across the
globe”(Risk). Essentially, LIBOR is a very prominent rate and has significant impact

on the financial markets. While discarding outliers in the calculation, the LIBOR rate
provides an illustration for liquidity in the market on differing maturities. Most
institutions adhered to the principal that all cash flows received by the institution
from derivatives should be discounted at the rate that banks would need to fund the
transaction. This belief also held true for transactions of all maturities. For the years
preceding the crisis, all banks believed that capital would be readily available to
borrow at LIBOR. Yet, the credit and liquidity aspects of the financial crisis proved
LIBOR to be unreliable as a risk free rate. The toxic assets that comprised so many
financial statements and balance sheets created uncertainty among major banks.
Many institutions did not trust their counterparties and therefore offered recordbreaking rates to determine the new LIBOR rate. The easy lending policies that
fueled the housing boom began to change.
In the beginning, housing prices declined across the country and many
people saw their equity stakes in homes fall drastically. Delinquencies on mortgages
were rampant and loan payments dried up quickly. Therefore, the financial assets
that converted such loans in to securities began to fall. The various CDOs that were
created from dozens mezzanine tranches across a series of asset-backed securities
followed suit. Additionally, high percentages of these derivatives were funded
through margin. When a bank cannot meet margin requirements, it must default in
the transaction. According to the Federal Reserve, banks were “concerned about the
size and location of the exposure to subprime-related assets and decided to stop
lending to other banks”(Federal Reserve). Banks began scrambling to scrap together
any readily available capital that could be posted as collateral for the transactions.

Unfortunately, banks began to fail as capital requirements could not be met and
bankruptcy was forced upon them. Consequently, the market for short-term loans
began to dry up as institutions attempted to roll over obligations. The result was a
LIBOR rate that spiked drastically, sending the TED spread to an unprecedented 460
basis points. The TED spread is the difference between LIBOR and the Federal
Funds Rate. Any spike in this rate signals distress within the economy and a lack of
trust among bank lenders. With a record-breaking LIBOR rate, financial derivatives
and all related cash flows would be priced far below fair value. LIBOR could not
longer be considered a risk-free rate.

The fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 sent the market in to frenzy. Lehman
Brothers had over 900,000 derivatives contracts outstanding, with over 150,000
attached to other prominent investment banks. The possibility of default became
evident within every bank that held toxic assets. Prominent institutions began
doubting counterparts and uncertainty impacted the borrowing rates. As interest
rates soared, skepticism in the derivatives market grew and trading grinded to a
near halt. Banks began liquidating positions in derivatives transactions, as well as
the credit default swaps used to hedge those transactions. The bid-ask spread for

OTC transactions soared as banks became wary of the credit worthiness of their
counterparties. Banks began a flight for quality in an attempt to relieve their
institutions of the toxic assets and regain credible standing within the markets. Two
important characteristics forced financial institutions to reevaluate their exposure
to derivatives: a sharp increase in short-term interest rates and further uncertainty
of the intrinsic value of derivatives.

OIS and Derivative Valuation
The graph above provides an illustration for the “global reach of the liquidity
crisis around the financial crisis and makes clear that a spread that has been
constant for years can suddenly explode” (Jens van Egmond). Previously the LIBOR
rate had been known for representing the risk-free rate and offering a prediction for
the liquidity environment. Yet, during the peak of the crisis, banks began hoarding
funds and severely hindering capital lending for fear of bankruptcy. The downfall of
Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers reacquainted fear in to the market. Now, the
question of derivative valuation becomes a concern and financial institutions must
configure a more reliable approach to discounting future cash flows. For instance,
the collateral aspect of derivatives must also be revalued. Banks and large
institutions that dealt with derivatives began paying closer attention to the
collateralized side of transactions. For example, an interest rate swap starts out with
an intrinsic value of zero. It isn’t until some time until one party of the transaction
has a negative value and owes money to the other party. These payments are
recorded mark-to-market in order to reflect the true value of the transaction. The

party with a negative value must acquire funds to post as collateral in the
transaction. The cost of funding this capital is the adequate rate to discount all
future cash flows. When liquidity is scarce, the cost of funding the capital increases,
effectively decreasing the value of all future cash flows. Furthermore, an interest
rate is provided on the payment to reflect the value of the payment as one party
holds it. This interest rate is known as the overnight interest rate (OIS) and is the
average rate that is charged for loans in the overnight market. In the United States,
the applicable overnight rate is the effective Federal Funds rate. According to the St.
Louis Federal Reserve, the OIS market provides little risk because “there is no
exchange of principal; funds are exchanged only at the maturity of contract, when
one party pays the net interest obligation to the other” (St. Louis Fed). The LIBOR
rate is greatly affected by an increase in illiquidity while the OIS remains relatively
more stable. Before the crisis, the difference between LIBOR and OIS was a mere 7
basis points. During the crisis, however, the LIBOR-OIS spread spiked to recordbreaking numbers. Banks became uncertain of default within the lending market
and charged higher interest rates when lending to other banks. The LIBOR-OIS can
presumably be an indicator on the health of the banking industry and “a barometer
of fear for bank insolvency” (St. Louis Fed).

Valuation Implications
Due to the stressed
tressed conditions of the market, the LIBOR
LIBOR-OIS
OIS spread provides
a glimpse into the stability of inter
inter-bank lending. Given the graph above, discounting
practices with LIBOR would severely impact the intrinsic value for derivative cash
flows. The OIS rate, however, more accurately reflects the ability to lend and borrow
within the short-term
term market. The LIBOR rate provides a much lower value for
discounting cash flows, thus low
low-balling the true price for derivatives. While LIBOR
spiked during the crisis, OIS remained relatively stable. The LIBOR rate would
provide a much more significant discount to all future cash flows, thus effectively
effecti
reducing the present value.. The consensus rate for discounting must be stable and
LIBOR has proven to be volatile in certa
certain situations. Derivatives should be valued
using the cost incurred in acquiring funds for the transaction. Additionally, these
t
complex instruments are funded through different sources and must be discounted
accordingly. Analyzing the different types of co
collateral
llateral and the effects on derivatives

provides risk management and lessens the possibility of credit risk for firms that are
“in-the-money”. When a firm is out-of-the money, capital must be posted to ensure
margin requirements for the transaction. Hence, recent reform has created Credit
Support Anexes as one part of the ISDA Master Agreement in attempt to mitigate
risk among derivative transactions. This reform provides specific instructions for
capital requirements on a given transaction. For large institutions, posting capital to
meet standards requires borrowing at the overnight rate. Therefore, the overnight
rate is the cost that large institutions must incur to secure funding for cashcollateral transactions. There are, however, various forms of collateral in derivative
transactions. Reform and regulation will provide transparency to the derivatives
market as institutions learn more about the assets.
Changing the valuation of an entire industry is complex and time-consuming.
Bootstrapping and rebuilding a 30-year LIBOR model is noticeably different than
creating a long-term curve for OIS rates. On average, the LIBOR-OIS spread hovers
around 7 basis points when the markets are relatively stable. Long-term curves
begin to differ and provide noticeable changes in present value calculations with
LIBOR providing the lower value. Obviously, differences in in valuations will create
confusion in the market as institutions transition to OIS. Recently, institutions
revalued their derivative portfolios and returned varied results. BNP Paribas
released a news report that the bank took a “108 million Euro hit during the switch
to OIS discounting” (Risk). Morgan Stanley, on the other hand, reported a net gain on
principal transactions. Fluctuations in derivative values will also vary based on the
volume and type of derivatives in the transaction. While new trades may be quoted

with fresh OIS discounting, older transactions must be revalued to reflect the price
of any off-market swaps. Less-sophisticated firms may find it more difficult to
implement a new valuation system within the company. Banks and dealers are
requesting “LCH Clearnet will need to make some changes to support the
establishment of the new pricing standard” (The Price is Wrong). Currently, LCH
calculates collateral on interest payments with OIS, but uses LIBOR when
discounting future cash flows. Consensus is needed from the regulatory bodies to
create more a more efficient derivatives market. Although price discrepancies are
not damaging now, further confusion surrounding derivatives transaction might
worsen as the market continues to grow.
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